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Abstract 
Despite decades of interventions, emergency response is yet to be integrated effectively with long-
term development. NGOs have suggested resilience as a potential framework for bridging this gap. 
Simultaneously, there has been a push towards localisation in development programming and a call 
for a shift of power towards those affected by crises. However, resilience is a largely theoretical 
concept that has been driven from the top-down and as such lacks local voice and a means for 
practical implementation. This paper responds by investigating resilience building as a mechanism to 
align short term humanitarian aid with longer-term development from the perspective of crises 
survivors and local field staff involved in eight humanitarian interventions. Transformative, adaptive 
and absorptive modes of resilience are identified. Six mechanisms for Survivor-Led Response are 
proposed: psycho-social support, early livelihood support, community empowerment, community 
cohesion, government collaboration and addressing the root causes of vulnerability. Survivor-Led 
Response and reconstruction show demonstrable ability to enhance local capacity and improve 
development prospects and, as such, should remain an overarching ambition of humanitarian 
interventions in the context of the SDGs and Build Back Better agenda.  
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1 Introduction 
The Sendai Framework [1] calls for a Build Back Better Agenda: for countries to work with agencies 
leading response and reconstruction to take on the responsibility for enhancing local development 
opportunity and wellbeing through their actions. This is an urgent and challenging agenda. There are 
few cases where humanitarian response has accelerated human flourishing. Ambition stalls at ‘doing 
no harm’, and even this aim is too often missed. To offer specific programming input to move 
beyond this impasse a Christian Aid-led consortium of humanitarian NGOs and King’s College London 
studied eight events from the perspective of local survivors. This differs from previous analysis which 
has focused on the views of those responsible for programming. Findings confirm a desire for 
Survivor-Led Response and reconstruction to Build Back Better, and identity six priority mechanisms 
proposed by local actors. This does not provide a complete template for Building Back Better. Taking 
account of structural conditions and long-term processes (such as global environmental change) may 
not be visible locally, but the results do identify a core set of principles and a tangible agenda to 
move the Build Back Better agenda forward. 
The importance of enhancing local leadership, including through the promotion of local viewpoints 
in response and reconstruction programming, has broader significance through the World 
Humanitarian Summit, Localisation Agenda [2]. This encourages national and international NGOs to 
facilitate more locally-led response and financing for humanitarian action. The timeliness and 
importance is reinforced by initiatives such as the Charter for Change [3], the Grand Bargain [4] and 
Time to Let Go [5] which are increasingly influential throughout the humanitarian and development 
sector. These initiatives advocate for the benefits of shifting power from donors and INGOs to local 
actors and locally-led responses. Investment in community preparedness allows a more effective 
and efficient humanitarian response as well as smoother transition to recovery and development [1]. 
For this to happen an evidence base is needed of pathways for moving towards locally led action. 
Survivor-Led Response provides one such approach. 
Bene et al’s [6] framework was deployed as an analytical framework to distinguish between the 
absorptive, adaptive and transformative facets of resilience in humanitarian action. This was applied 
to eight humanitarian interventions across seven countries (Bangladesh, Colombia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan and the Philippines). These interventions were 
selected to cover a diverse range of scales of crisis, hazards (including conflict, cyclone, drought, 
floods, tsunami and typhoon), and development contexts. The aim was to identify local views 
common to these diverse contexts as a starting point for the design of localised resilience-building 
agendas.  
The paper first outlines the relationship between Build Back Better, resilience thinking and long-
standing debates on the linking of relief, rehabilitation and development, followed by a 
methodological note. Results provide a summary of local perceptions of resilience and identify six 
core recommendations for Survivor Led Response. The paper concludes with reflections on 
implications for the wider international aid sector.  
2. Resilience and the Humanitarian Sector 
Resilience has many faces, and one application of resilience aims to describe interventions that draw 
development gains from humanitarian action. From this perspective, the UNISDR Sendai Framework 
[1] calls on nation states and their partners to build resilience through response and reconstruction 
by Building Back Better. Enhancing sustainable development through humanitarian action is 
ambitious. Many responses are challenged even to reach pre-disaster standards of land distribution, 
livelihood, housing, health and ecological integrity. To date, most of this debate on the barriers to 
better linking humanitarian response to long term development has been framed by the viewpoints 
and experiences of donors [7] and humanitarian agencies [8] [9] [10] rather than the views and 
preferences of the local actors who are central to humanitarian responses. Their input has remained 
at the edges of debate, too often filtered through expert and professional opinion. It is here that this 
paper makes its contribution. 
Aligning development and humanitarian assistance seems straightforward and sensible; yet 
implementation has proven challenging [11] [12]. Solutions to this impasse have been sought in 
better understand how disasters occur. Debate has shifted from conceptualising disasters and 
humanitarian response as a linear progression, to understanding the cyclical nature of disaster 
management [12] where development, response, preparedness and recovery can overlap. In 
response, donors have supported aid agencies through, for example, flexible programming to allow 
emergency response to support longer term resilience building; flexible funding mechanisms, such 
as USAID’s ‘crisis modifiers’, to meet newly emerging short-term needs within long-term projects; 
and programmes that seek to build capacities to address existing and future risks such as DFID’s 
Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters programme [13]. 
In practice, the international aid sector continues to struggle to align preparedness, response and 
development interventions. Within the context of humanitarian response, the holism associated 
with wider thinking on resilience as a management approach offers an opportunity to bring together 
the two types of international assistance by focusing management through flexibility, innovation, 
preparedness and cross scale integration [14]. But here again, resilience is constructed largely 
through the perspectives of implementing agencies.  
 
3. Linking relief and development 
Conceptualisation of the relationship between disaster response and underlying development has 
evolved from discussion of a relief continuum [11], to the relief contiguum [15] and the 
securitization of humanitarian interventions [15]. All three positions have been criticised for under-
theorising the complexity of interaction between humanitarian and development interventions [14]. 
More recently calls were made to understand resilience’s role in the debate [14] [12]. 
The relief continuum presents a linear relationship between response and development.  
Consequently, policy recommendations focus on innovating methods for progressing from 
humanitarian aid to development programming. Uncertainty around what should be handed over, to 
whom and when, led to criticism that this linear model was unable to capture the complexities of 
intervention and the cyclical, multiple stages of crises management [4]. 
In response, the contiguum offers a more comprehensive and holistic model. It is cyclical, explores 
all stages of post-disaster response and recognises that linking relief and development should be 
about all events, not just natural disasters, and non–events (everyday life) as well. It takes a human 
rights approach, specifically focusing on duty bearers’ responsibility and the ability of people to 
claim their rights. It incorporates governance and introduces the idea that a shock or crisis can 
create the social, political and economic space needed to address root causes of vulnerability and 
tackle human rights issues [16] [15] [17] [12]. In its turn, the contiguum approach has been criticised 
for assuming a stable government willing and able to take up responsibility for citizens’ welfare and 
for conceptualising crises as one-off events. The contiguum does not fit well with the challenges of 
protracted crises and events that can lead to, trigger or act as a catalyst for future shocks, stressors 
and crises [18] [15] [12]. 
The 1990s was a period of considerable debate around humanitarian neutrality, drawing on 
experience from interventions in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Following the 9/11 
World Trade Centre attack in 2001, the international development sector began to align more 
closely with the securitisation agenda. Greater attention in aid and development budgets was given 
to terrorism, global security and stabilisation. Consequently, the World Bank began to receive 
pressure to deliver assistance to failed states. Here, the need to better link humanitarian support 
with longer-term development became politicised and intertwined with the war on terror [20]. This 
new era of aid politicisation has created an environment where interventions have been increasingly 
scrutinized on the principles of humanitarian neutrality, impartiality and independence [15] [12] 
making it harder to bridge between emergency response and development programming. 
Strategic reviews of the humanitarian sector, such as the UK government Humanitarian Emergency 
Response Review [20] questioned the goals of humanitarian assistance, as well as the actors and 
capacities required to deliver it. Whilst a greater focus on working in protracted crises has seen 
increasing innovation and cross-disciplinary work to better align humanitarian and development 
interventions, significant tactical and systemic problems still exist and the development of a practical 
methods for overcoming them are under-developed [15] [12].  
Ultimately, there appears to be an absence of a strategic framework and set of common principles 
that span the humanitarian and development sector [15]. More work is required to trial, pilot and 
document sustainable humanitarian response programmes that link to longer term development 
initiatives [11] [15] [12]. Mosel and Levin [12] outline six ways in which the humanitarian and 
development sector could begin aligning work in practice. They encourage humanitarian 
interventions to (1) be flexible and risk-taking with an openness to learning, (2) begin with a 
thorough contextual and political analysis, (3) work with local institutions, (4) include joint analysis 
and learning at country level, (5) be centred on realistic programming and (6) promote adaptive 
capacity. The guidance outlined in this paper builds on these principles to articulate a community-
centred mechanism for Building Back Better. 
1.1 Community resilience for practical and localised relief to development 
The resilience agenda came to the fore during the UN International Decade for Natural Disaster 
Reduction in the 1990s and the subsequent Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-15 [21] [22]. These 
initiatives were themselves an extension of the “build back better” debate of the 1980s and have 
been returned to the Sendai Framework in its call for Building Back Better. A parallel process was 
ongoing within the climate change community. Both communities of practice developed their own 
definitions, terminologies, departments and dedicated funding. The IPCC Special Report on 
Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation [23] was 
an important publication that brought the two sectors closer [19].  
Only in the late 2000s did disaster risk reduction (DRR) practitioners begin systematically exploring 
resilience as a term to describe interventions that can support the wellbeing of risk exposed 
communities [24]. DFID promoted this view of resilience, initially within the humanitarian sector 
through the Building Disaster Resilience Community programme (2007-2010), followed by initiatives 
such as Enhancing Community Resilience Programme (2011-2016) in Malawi and BRACED (2014-
2017), which pushed forward a more integrated approach between DRR and climate change 
adaptation. Some actors have made efforts to integrate more local views into their work. For 
example, the Interagency Resilience working group of UK based humanitarian agencies, set up by 
DFID as part of its Programme Partnership Agreement (2011-2016), helped to transform resilience 
into practical action. This approach promoted the deployment of recurrent vulnerability and capacity 
assessment as a key feature for community-based resilience implementation.  
 
2 Methods  
This study investigated views of 83 local actors and 244 survivors from eight humanitarian 
interventions, deployed by seven different International Non-Government Organisations (INGOs) 
within the Linking Preparedness Response and Resilience in Emergency Contexts (LPRR) project 
consortium. As an inductive study, the sample aimed for a diverse set of cases reflecting different 
NGO characteristics, hazard types, vulnerability and development trends. Individual cases were 
identified by partner INGOs. The characteristics of the case study sites are outlined in Table 1.  
Data were collected through three qualitative methods: 
1. Semi-structured interviews with key informants including local leaders and first responders 
(8-10 respondents per study site) 
2. Semi-structured interviews with community members (5-10 respondents per study site) 
3. Focus group discussions (FGDs) with local community members. The FGDs included risk and 
resilience mapping as the primary data collection method. (2 per study site including 8-12 
respondents in each). 
Within each study site purposive sampling was adopted to identify and target specific respondents 
for interviews and FGDs. In addition, household interviews and FGD participants were selected to 
achieve a diverse mix of respondents which included intervention beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries (where a blanket approach of aid had not been taken), as well as a mixture of gender, 
age, (dis)ability and, if contextually appropriate, different ethnicities, castes and tribes. Data sets 
were transcribed and analysed through NVivo software (for full methodological notes see individual 
case study reports on the DEPP Learning Platform [25]).  
During interviews, respondents were asked to reflect on their own vision of a resilient community, 
whether they felt the community had coped, adapted or transformed to/with the crises, what 
challenges they face in recent response and reconstruction and what they would recommend should 
be done before or during future crises to better position humanitarian and development 
interventions to ensure long term community resilience building.  
Table 1: Eight Interventions   
 
2.1 Caveats and limitations 
The researcher’s affiliation with gatekeeper INGOs in the LPRR consortium may have led local 
respondents to adjust their responses. This was minimised by speaking with a range of stakeholders 
using mixed methods. Language and cultural barriers were difficult to overcome but sensitive 
methods such as open discussion were used when possible, or structured interview guides also 
helped to minimise bias introduced by translation. Furthermore, the research team worked closely 
with local in-country researchers to align terminology in translation. Finally, high staff turn-over and 
the loss of institutional memory meant information on past events was difficult to obtain and verify. 
Logistical issues such as accessing remote sites and obtaining visas has meant some of the most 
vulnerable populations were not as easy to include. These constraints were felt across the studies 
but most severely in the DRC. 
3 Results 
Survivor recommendations for building back better are contextual, shaped by experiences of local 
and humanitarian actor behaviour during specific events. This section provides context by reporting 
on the meanings of resilience presented by respondents and actions identified by respondents that 
led to household coping, adaptation and transformational change. The section then presents 
challenges and recommendations for action to build back better from the viewpoint of survivors.   
 
3.1 The meaning of resilience 
Reported perspectives of survivors on the meanings and practice of resilience spoke to individual 
needs and priorities (e.g. the need for secure tenure, flood walls, income or early warning systems).  
The predominant view of resilience was that it was held in tension between a desired independence 
from international actors and yet being able to access external support when needed. Practicing 
resilience meant having the skills, knowledge, information and capacity to meet individual needs 
whilst knowing how and where to ask for external support for local objectives. Discussions of 
resilience and the scope for humanitarian action to build this into programming returned again and 
again to issues of local agency, empowerment, decision making power and the ability to influence 
day to day life. Such language defined independence and directly linked resilience to local 
aspirations for wellbeing, hope and dignity. 
A resilient community – one that could voice and approach its desired future - was associated with 
supportive government (and freedom from government pressures where the state was party to 
conflict, as in Colombia and DRC), good governance, local social cohesion and independence from 
international support. A desire for independence from international actors did not signify an 
unwillingness to engage. Respondents supported international agencies that recognised a moral 
obligation to help local actors strengthen their relationship with the government, support them to 
advocate their needs and specifically build the capacity of the government to effectively protect and 
prepare at risk communities from future crises. This view was reflected by survivors and local 
international NGO (INGO) staff. As one INGO field officer stated: “Bring the community and the local 
government together, to work hand-in-hand”. In summary, local respondents did not want 
international assistance to disappear, but wanted to gain greater control over delivery and to be 
able to initiate, as well as be consulted on, programming to protect local capacity from being 
overwhelmed through humanitarian actions. 
 
3.2 Local perceptions of resilience as coping, adaptation and transformation 
The resilience of local actors is an aspiration approached through a range of locally deployed actions. 
Making sense of these actions, the study deployed Bene et al’s [6] framework and asked participants 
whether they felt the community had coped, adapted or transformed. In sum, the majority of 
participants described deploying their own capacities to absorb and adapt. Partnership with extra-
local actors was required (government in particular) to be able to realise transformational aspects of 
resilience (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Resilience experienced 
 
The majority of absorption strategies relied on individual capacities – temporary evacuation for 
example. Adaptation actions centred on livelihood diversification that required more substantive 
economic and other assets (including social capital) and access to information and were constrained 
by wider infrastructure assets such as transport networks to access market. Transformation was 
associated with making direct and purposeful change in political and decision-making systems.  
Change that opened scope for enhanced sustainable development and Building Back Better. 
Transformative action was reported from the Philippines (elderly) and Pakistan (women). Here, local 
actors strengthened ongoing processes of social change through response and reconstruction. 
Elsewhere local actors reported feeling unable to act because of a lack of resources or support to 
advocate for change. Here is an opportunity for humanitarian actors to support local processes of 
Building Back Better.  
 
Directing local risk management capacity into the constrained practices of absorption and 
adaptation placed the household as the primary institution and responsible actor for post-disaster 
response and recovery. Local actors filled a gap left by a lack of organised state and NGO response. 
Households filling gaps relied predominantly on coping mechanisms that allowed survival [17] but 
reduced the resource base and options for longer-term wellbeing. This should be a concern for 
humanitarian and development actors with poverty reduction mandates. Exceptions were found in 
observed transformative actions. Transformative change actions were associated with humanitarian 
programming that had engaged with local actors to jointly reflect on and develop strategies to 
challenge root causes of risk that would otherwise reproduce vulnerability post-disaster and limit 
equitable and sustainable development. 
 
3.3: Survivor Identified challenges and recommendations 
Building from the local actions identified in Table 2, respondents identified challenges that existed 
despite their own and NGO-led interventions, and recommendations for NGOs to strengthen local 
actors through response and reconstruction.  Challenges and recommendations are aggregated 
(Tables 3 and 4) and show similar priorities.  In addition to challenges and recommendations, 
respondents expressed an aspiration for survivor-led response and reconstruction. This formed the 
overriding theme of statements from respondents with recommendations offering mechanisms 
through which survivor-led response could be built into programming to build back better.  
Calls for survivor-led response was a reaction to the experience of survivors who had been 
marginalised from their own recovery through a lack of decision-making power. Feelings of 
disempowerment were identified as challenges embedded in the management but also the scope of 
humanitarian programming, for example where there was inadequate support for locally 
determined psychological care. This was not only for extreme cases of trauma but for more 
commonplace experiences of depression and stress. Also important as a challenge and 
recommendation was the need for rapid support of livelihoods. Without this, respondents reported 
feeling disempowered, facing a drift into aid dependency, even if temporary, and increased risks of 
community breakdown.  
Identified as challenges, but not developed further in recommendations for future programming 
were the consequences of broken transport routes and of local conflict – both of which impacted on 
local social and economic capacity to recover. To an extent, these concerns were captured in the 
recommendation that survivor led response should aim to tackle root causes, which were very 
context dependent but included conflict, insufficient market access and social isolation.  
Recommendations focussed on operational relationships. There was an emphasis on mechanisms to 
support community cohesion, two-way dialogue between community and humanitarian actors and 
between any humanitarians and local government. Local government was often seen as integral to 
local leadership in response and reconstruction. Table 3 and 4 include the number of respondents 
citing for each priority. This is included to indicate relative importance. Psychological support and 
rapid livelihoods support stand out as leading priorities for local respondents. 
Table 3: Challenges for local actors in recovering under existing response and reconstruction 
programming   
 
Table 4: Recommendations for improving response and reconstruction programming to enable 
build back better approach 
 
These findings offer deployable recommendations that if combined offer a roadmap for bridging 
humanitarian and development interventions in response and reconstruction. They describe a policy 
space for transformational community resilience-building through empowering local actors to shape 
reconstruction for development opportunity and Build Back Better.  
4 Discussion 
This section revisits in more detail the six recommendations identified in Table 2 and presents these 
as elements of a Survivor-Led Response and Reconstruction to help deliver the Build Back Better 
agenda. We comment on this approach below and then discuss its components.  
4.1 Survivor-Led Response and Reconstruction 
“Let the people design the response. Then they would respond immediately” (Crisis 
survivor).  
“If we don’t ask the community what they want then how can we expect the design to 
be fruitful in the long term?” (Field staff). 
“A big problem is the community feeling: they have no power, no hope. Help them run 
the response. We need to inspire them. Encourage them and support them to realise 
they do have power over their situation. They need to motivate each other to raise each 
other out of their situation” (Field staff).  
Figure 1 represents the integrated, survivor-led vision called for by respondents. Each component is 
connected and feeds into the vision of a survivor-led response and reconstruction process that can 
help deliver the aims of the Build Back Better agenda. Local actors do not offer a panacea: power 
inequalities, domination and exploitation are as prevalent locally as they are in wider social systems. 
However, opening up response and recovery management to more meaningful local leadership, 
generates spaces that are created for local reflection on development and for the taking of 
responsibility for building future visions for daily life. This is an important element of psychological 
recovery. 
 
Figure 1: Survivor led Response for Building Back Better 
 
Survivor-led response is the norm in the immediate aftermath of disasters, before external aid 
arrives. The views expressed in this study show that when it does arrive, existing humanitarian 
programming fails to harness local capacity in response and reconstruction. It misses an opportunity 
to leverage these periods to support transformative processes of social enhancement. Rather, local 
agency is in danger of being supressed or distorted through humanitarian engagement. This keeps 
response and reconstruction trapped in cycles of absorptive and adaptive modes of resilience and 
misses an opportunity to build on local ambition for transformation as part of resilience building. 
In the Philippines case studies, survivors explained responding to the crises long before INGOs 
arrived. They felt if they had been in control of the response they would not have suffered long 
delays in receiving aid. In Indonesia, crises survivors felt that if they had been empowered to run the 
response, aid dependency could have been avoided. Respondents explained that the way in which 
the INGO’s and local NGO’s disseminated aid after the 2004 tsunami created a culture of 
dependence to the point where community members would not even participate in a community 
meeting without some form of financial incentive.  
Equally, local respondents argued that once opportunities for local leadership had been created, the 
priorities of psychological support, livelihoods, communication, social cohesion and working with the 
government were required to sustain and further strengthen individual, household and community 
resilience over time and at scale.   
4.2 Components of a survivor-led response strategy 
The following sections detail the components of a survivor led response strategy, as identified by 
local respondents and presented in Figure 1. These offer a set of practical mechanisms for the 
programming and evaluation of survivor-led response. In presenting these recommendations, we 
recognise that it is challenging to programme for local leadership, whilst ensuring inclusion, adhering 
to the ‘do no harm’ standards and avoiding (re)enforcing existing power inequalities and 
marginalisation that may already exist in communities.  
Component 1: Include psychological support 
“Psycho-social support is an essential area of learning and capacity building that our 
staff, volunteers and communities still need.” (Field staff).  
“Understanding what trauma is and how to deal with it needs to happen before an 
individual can think about building their resilience. You need to mentally and 
emotionally bring them back first.” (Field officer). 
“My husband did not speak for weeks because of the trauma. He could not participate 
because he could not speak” (Crisis survivor). 
An overwhelming number of respondents identified mental health as an essential component of 
individual, household and community resilience. Crises survivors and first responders reported that 
the mental, emotional and spiritual impact of a crisis significantly limited the ability of a community 
to bounce back better and engage and participate in interventions. Failing to address these impacts 
exacerbated dysfunctional social behaviour such as social withdrawal, crime, alcohol and drug abuse.  
In Banda Aceh, Indonesia, respondents explained that the level of distress that the survivors had 
experienced meant that a high number of survivors struggled to speak at public events and 
participate in reconstruction and livelihood programs. In Indonesia and the Philippines, where 
psychological support was received, this was the most valued component of response.  
“The best thing was the trauma centre, it changed the way we think about wellbeing. It 
is a very positive outcome” (Crisis Survivor).  
“Counselling is crucial, give them hope, emotional and spiritual support” (Field staff).  
In Nairobi, survivors of sexual abuse following a food security crisis explained that the lack of 
psychological support and lack of a faith leader meant they were still struggling to come to terms 
with why they were attacked. This had impacted their self-worth and led to a high number of 
survivors turning to prostitution to make enough money to feed their families; and alcoholism and 
drugs to cope with the difficult conditions life. 
It is noticeable that both conflict response interventions in Colombia and the DRC already had 
psychological support as a fundamental component identified by respondents as a core strength of 
both programs. Here, psychological support mechanisms were directly linked to strengthened social 
cohesion and community togetherness as self-help groups were established. 
Component 2: Early focus on livelihoods, income generation, cash and savings 
 “Allow us to economically thrive and to live in peace and we will look after ourselves” 
(Crisis survivor).  
“The most important thing is getting a source of income back as soon as possible” (Crisis 
survivor). 
These two quotes reflect the importance placed on early livelihood recovery for survivors to regain 
their independence as soon as possible post-event. Respondents highlighted the benefits of income 
generation and cash programmes for acting as an immediate buffer between the crisis and 
(re)establishing a secure income.  
In Banda Aceh, the failure of humanitarian programming to adequately support the re-establishment 
of original or alternative livelihoods left some survivors worse off economically than before the 2004 
tsunami. In Colombia, DRC, Kenya and the Philippines, survivors expended savings and food surplus 
to protect productive assets in the face of potential future events. Sustainable livelihoods are a 
necessity for any resilience strengthening initiative post- and pre-event.  
Component 3: Support community cohesion and establish effective communication between crisis 
survivors 
“We are stronger together. Organise, organise, organise for everyone to come together 
and work together as a unit. Only then can you rise up and change your circumstances.” 
(Crisis survivor).   
Respondents stated that feelings of community cohesion (togetherness) enabled community 
strength and the ability to work together required for at-risk households, and by extension for 
communities, to cope, adapt and transform with risk. Community cohesion strengthened well-being 
through shared social values and the recovery of a common sense of place and belonging. Social 
cohesion was vulnerable to both the disaster event and external interventions, especially for large 
events with multiple, often overwhelming, external agency activity. Respondents called for external 
actors to be sensitive to this. 
Component 4: Establish effective two-way communication between crisis survivors and implementing 
organisations  
 “Clear communication is needed. Mouth-to-ear communication wasn’t successful and 
that many crises survivors got confused, information was misinterpreted, other 
information was brought in. This resulted in making people frustrated and angry at each 
other” (Field staff).  
“We didn’t know when the NGOs were coming, we didn’t want to go to work in case we 
missed them and missed out on receiving help. We didn’t understand why some people 
received help and others did not. This made some people very angry with each other” 
(Crisis survivor).  
Whilst an event can bring people together, unclear communication about humanitarian 
programming can exacerbate pre-existing community tensions, fractions and divides. Two-way 
communication during the humanitarian response phase was central to prevent erosion of, and help 
build, social cohesion. A resilient community should have strong community cohesion [2]. However, 
there will always be winners and losers and trade-offs in adaptation [27] [17] with clear 
communication between local actors and external agencies an essential part of any intervention [26] 
[28].  Our findings suggest that local actors are best placed to make decisions on any trade-offs, thus 
reinforcing the case for local inclusion, and potentially leadership, in response management.  
Component 5: Work with the government to coordinate interventions 
“A lot of people have been complaining about the lack of coordination. Lots of different 
groups and organisations doing the same thing” (Crisis survivor).  
 
“Collaborate with the government. The government must support you and you must 
accept support from the government. You must go together. Help the project bring the 
government and people together” (Field staff).  
 
Effective coordination of interventions has challenged the humanitarian sector for decades. For 
respondents the solution lay in empowering local level agents to run the response themselves. 
Respondents also called for INGOs to work better with all levels of the government. Involving 
government in humanitarian interventions from the offset was key for long term community 
resilience.  
 
Respondents argued that the post disaster, humanitarian response phase provided an opportunity 
for external organisations to help strengthen the relationship between at-risk communities and 
government. It also created an opportunity to build the capacity of the government to prepare and 
protect communities in the future. Local actors reported that good governance and a good 
relationship between local government and community were critical components for the community 
to be able to function independently and to be able to take on greater leadership and management 
roles in recovery and risk reduction. 
 
The international aid sector can no longer shy away from engaging with the government, even in 
conflict contexts [15]. In Colombia, humanitarian interventions utilised a human rights approach to 
reinforce government responsibility for citizens’ rights and provided a bridge between the 
government and community. In contrast, in DRC, respondents argued resilience could only be 
achieved with peace and peace could only be established in the long term with cooperation between 
the community and the government. Here, respondents explained that INGOs had a role in 
overseeing, supporting and mediating the relationship between the government and community. 
Exactly how to do this in a conflict sensitive way, in contexts of high levels of corruption and in 
violent and oppressive states requires further attention. 
Component 6: Address underlying causes of vulnerability: protect and prepare 
“Include advocacy for root causes as the primary focus from the offset. Build capacity 
and confidence of community to advocate for their needs.” (Field staff).  
 
“Look at the causes, why are we facing this disaster? Start addressing these issues with 
us and with the government” (Crisis survivor). 
While the disruption created by a disaster can open opportunities for previously marginalised groups 
to challenge their positions in society, it is more commonly observed that already dominant groups 
extend their influence, deepening, inequality through response [16] [17] [15] [12]. Respondents 
were clear in recognising this risk. In the Colombia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and the 
Philippines Haiyan studies marginalised groups explained how they had successfully challenged their 
position and changed their decision-making power in the post-event phase, allowing communities to 
bounce back better opening pathways for transformation strengthening resilience and building back 
better. 
In this context, respondents saw the role of the humanitarian sector as an enabling one, supporting 
the community in making best use of the post-disaster space to identify, challenge and advocate for 
change. In all case studies where this was successful, communities had been given the power to 
identify root causes, organise themselves and design their own response. In Bangladesh, women 
were supported to lead the humanitarian response reinforcing ongoing local changes in gendered 
relations. By being enabled to work and make decisions in the community, respondents explained 
that the women effectively reshaped their role and place in the community. 
 
4.  Conclusions  
Survivor-led response offers a way to break the current impasse between humanitarian and 
development action. The results are pertinent to a range of ongoing international initiatives such as 
the Localisation Agenda and Charter for Change [3], the Grand Bargain [4] and Time to Let Go [5]. 
These initiatives advocate for radical changes in the design and implementation of interventions and 
are becoming increasingly influential throughout the humanitarian sector. A locally-led approach 
goes beyond Bene et al’s [6] call for resilient approaches to be participatory, and provides a practical 
way to incorporate social values and local knowledge to challenge unequal power dynamics by 
mobilising the most vulnerable and ensuring marginalised groups gain decision-making power [27] 
[29]. By allowing crises preparedness and response to be flexible enough to be locally-led and 
shaped by those living at risk, the institutional and organisational constraints can be challenged and 
transformation a possibility within the Build Back Better agenda.  
Having identified the potential for community-led response to place resilience more centrally for 
those living with risk and poverty, the paper identifies five mechanisms that can constitute a 
baseline for programming development and evaluation. These are not intended to be a complete 
and constraining set of guidelines for all interventions, but rather a comprehensively-researched 
starting point for programming that seeks to move beyond the humanitarian-development impasse 
through the mechanism of enhanced local responsibility, and potentially, leadership. The elements 
of this agenda are: psycho-social support, early livelihood support, community empowerment, 
community cohesion, government collaboration and addressing the root causes of vulnerability. 
These are mutually reinforcing, for example: community cohesion and robust livelihoods support 
psychological health; government collaboration can generate scope for addressing root causes. 
Respondents identified challenges with implementing these recommendations and recognised they 
would require considerable policy commitment and investment in the preparedness phase to put 
appropriate knowledge, management systems and practical procedures in place. Locally-led 
approaches also pose challenges for upwards accountability. For example, in moving control from 
humanitarian actors to local actors, humanitarians can less directly guarantee to meet agreed 
standards, such as the Sphere Standards [30]. However, the five recommendations provide practical 
mechanisms for external actors to better support, and engage with, local actors in a way that is 
equitable and sustainable. 
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Figure 1: Survivor led Response for Building Back Better 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Eight Interventions   
Location Hazard Crises drivers Year, duration 
of intervention 
Context Impact 
Philippines, 
Manila 
Typhoon 
Ketsana  
Marginalisation of urban 
poor. Lack of land rights 
2010: 3 years Urban 
 
Displacement, loss of housing, 
loss of livelihoods, loss of land 
rights 
Philippines, 
Ormoc 
Typhoon 
Haiyan  
Remote location. Poor access 
to area for emergency 
response. Livelihoods reliant 
on one crop (coconuts)  
2014: 2 years Rural 
 
Large scale loss of life, loss of 
housing, loss of livelihoods 
Kenya, 
Nairobi  
Drought, 
political 
instability 
and food 
insecurity 
Poor seasonal rains and 
political insecurity 
surrounding the elections 
(2011-2012) pushed food 
prices up. 
2012: 6 months Urban, 
informal 
settlement 
Increased malnutrition, child 
malnutrition, increased rates 
of violent crime, prostitution 
and school drop outs  
Indonesia, 
Banda Aceh 
Tsunami  Ongoing conflict between the 
government and GUM rebel 
2004: 4 years Peri – 
urban and 
Large scale loss of life, 
destruction of housing, 
Survivor-led 
response and 
reconstruction for 
building back 
better 
Communication 
between 
community and 
NGOs 
Psycho- Social 
support 
NGOs work 
with local 
government 
Immediate 
livelihood 
support 
Confront 
root 
causes 
Community 
participation 
and cohesion 
group. rural, 
protracted 
conflict 
infrastructure and livelihoods 
 
Pakistan, 
Sindh   
Floods Government control over 
locations in which 
international agencies were 
allowed to work 
2012: 3 years Rural Loss of life, loss of housing, 
loss of livelihoods 
Colombia, 
Cacarica  
Conflict & 
Displacement 
Lack of land rights. 
Marginalisation of Afro 
Colombians. Ongoing conflict 
between government, 
paramilitary and rebel groups 
1998 – present 
3-year project 
within long 
term, 20 year 
country 
programme  
Rural, 
protracted 
conflict 
Loss of life, displacement, loss 
of land rights, loss of 
livelihoods 
Bangladesh, 
Patuakhali 
Cyclone Reoccurrence of seasonal 
floods and cyclones 
2013: 3 year 
project 
Rural Loss of life, loss of housing, 
loss of livelihoods 
DRC, South 
Kivu  
Conflict & 
Displacement  
Ongoing conflict between 
government and rebel groups. 
Continuous displacement  
2012: 9 months Rural, 
protracted 
conflict 
Loss of life. Ongoing and 
recurrent displacement; loss 
of homes and livelihoods  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Resilience experienced 
Case Study  Absorbing (Coping)  Adapting Transforming  
Bangladesh  Evacuating when hearing 
warning  
Diversifying income  Addressing core issues in society to 
change attitudes and perceptions; 
Reshaping women’s role and decision- 
making power in society  
DRC Running and hiding; Taping 
chicken beaks shut. Making 
hide outs in the forest; 
Cooking for rebel groups  
Creating EWS for rebel 
groups approaching; 
Creating community savings 
groups to work together  
None 
Indonesia  Opening homes to everyone 
and cooking enough food 
for everyone. Taking in lost 
children 
New livelihoods, 
preparedness, Early 
Warning System and DRR 
module in school curriculum  
End of conflict; Acceptance of rebel 
group as political party  
Kenya  Prostitution; Crime; 
Dropping children out of 
school; One meal a day 
Creating Savings  None  
Pakistan Evacuating houses  Raising houses Challenged women’s place decision 
making power in society and female 
education  
Philippines: 
Haiyan 
Sheltering in school in the 
storm  
Diversifying livelihoods, 
disaster preparedness plans, 
EWS 
 Challenged elderly peoples place and 
decision-making power in society  
Philippines: 
Ketsana  
Evacuating homes Diversifying livelihoods, 
developing a people’s plan, 
government lobbying  
None  
 
Table 3: Challenges for local actors in recovering under existing response and reconstruction 
programming   
# Challenge Number of citing 
respondents 
1 Trauma, mental, emotional and spiritual impact of crises 66 
2 A lack of decision making power to respond to crises themselves  56 
3 Lack of access in and out of the community (poor roads, lack of roads) 46 
4 Lack of focus on livelihoods, left community disempowered and aid 
dependent  
44 
5 Community togetherness was undermined, fragmented or reduced 43 
6 Conflict or insecurity  28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Recommendations for improving response and reconstruction programming to enable 
build back better approach 
Priority 
rank 
group 
Recommendation Number of citing 
respondents 
1 Include psychological support in humanitarian programming  118 
1 Include livelihoods and savings from the start of an intervention 109 
2 Enable a greater level of community participation and cohesion 
at all stages of the intervention  
48 
2 Strengthen two-way communication between NGOs and 
community members 
48 
2 NGOS should work closer with the government to raise 
awareness of risk, advocate for community needs and build 
government capacity  
42 
2 Tackle root causes of vulnerability from the outset of a 
humanitarian response, through a rights based protection 
oriented lens. 
35 
 
 
